政府与社会资本合作（PPP）模式的快速发展与中央政府解决地方政府债务问题的努力存在密切的关系。长期以来，地方政府通过融资平台公司举借债务进行基础设施与公共服务项目的投资与建设，推动了经济与社会发展，但是也导致了地方政府举债缺乏规模控制、融资成本高、收支未纳入预算进行管理等一系列的问题，造成了沉重的债务负担。
2014年，国务院印发《关于加强地方政府性债务管理的意见》，对地方政府性债务进行严格管理，明确规定政府不得通过企事业单位等举借债务。在此情形下，PPP作为防范和化解政府性债务风险的一种新的公共服务供给模式，得以迅速发展。
PPP模式下，政府采取竞争性方式择优选择具有投资、运营管理能力的社会资本，双方按照平等协商原则订立合同，明确责、权、利关系；由社会资本提供公共服务，政府依据公共服务绩效评价结果向社会资本支付相应对价。其具有以下特点：
其一，基础设施与公共服务项目的投资规模普遍较大。在财政部公布的第二批PPP示范项目中，投资额在10至50亿元之间的项目约占总数的31.1%；50至100亿元之间的项目约占7.8%；超过100亿元的项目约占7.2%。
其二，经营期限长。财政部《关于进一步做好政府和社会资本合作项目示范工作的通知》规定，政府和社会资本合作期限原则上不低于10年。在财政部发布的《政府和社会资本合作模式操作指南》中，财政部更是要求运用建设-运营-移交（BOT）、转让-运营-移交（TOT）、改建-运营-移交（ROT）模式的项目的合同期限一般为20至30年。
因此，贷款等传统融资方式难以满足PPP项目的资金需求，需要组合运用多种融资方式。根据PPP项目的操作过程，在社会资本方确定之后，一般需要经过项目设计与建设、项目运营两个阶段。
在项目设计与建设阶段，基础资产尚未形成，只能由项目公司通过贷款、股权等方式进行融资。实践中，由于PPP项目公司资金实力较弱，往往需要由社会资本方（PPP项目公司的股东）为其融资提供担保，这给社会资本方带来极大的财务压力。
在PPP项目进入运营期之后，其回报机制主要包括使用者付费、可行性缺口补助（VGF）和政府付费三种类型，均存在一定的现金流。此时，就可以通过资产证券化的方式进行融资，以实现社会资本方的退出或减轻其财务压力。
由此看来，在推进PPP模式发展的过程中，必然需要将PPP与资产证券化相结合，将PPP项目的现金流变成可投资的证券化产品。
从交易结构来看，PPP项目资产证券化有两种基本方式。
未来收益的资产证券化。中国证监会2014年11月发布的《证券公司及基金管理公司子公司资产证券化业务管理规定》规定，基础资产类型包括“基础设施、商业物业等不动产财产或不动产收益权”等类型。由此，可以针对PPP项目的未来收益设计资产证券化产品。
1.合理选择原始权益人（资产出让方）。未来收益的产生取决于原始权益人业务经营活动的正常开展，因此需要原始权益人具有持续经营能力，无重大经营风险、财务风险和法律风险。
2.设置现金流归集与监管措施。为了保证未来收益的及时归集，需要设计现金流归集机制，并通过账户监管等方式予以监管。
3.设计增信结构。为了防范未来现金流波动的风险，可以通过差额补足、超额覆盖等方式设计增信结构，增强产品的吸引力。
需要注意的是，根据中国证券投资基金业协会于2014年12月发布的《资产证券化业务基础资产负面清单指引》，“以地方政府为直接或间接债务人的基础资产”不得作为资产证券化的基础资产，但是该指引同时也将“地方政府按照事先公开的收益约定规则，在政府与社会资本合作模式下应当支付或承担的财政补贴”作为除外。由此，PPP项目中的财政补贴也可以作为资产证券化的基础资产。
“信托计划＋资产支持专项计划”的双SPV结构。一般而言，双SPV结构是由信托公司向PPP项目公司发放信托贷款，以PPP项目的未来收益为该项贷款提供质押担保，由此将PPP项目的未来收益装入信托计划。其后，再以信托受益权为基础资产发起设立资产支持专项计划。
需要注意的是，根据上述《负面清单指引》的规定，在双SPV结构中，信托计划的最终投资标的不得为负面清单中列明的资产类型。由此来看，在设计双SPV的资产证券化产品结构时，需要穿透来看，考察信托计划的基础资产是否符合相关监管规定的要求。
Asset securitization and the PPP model
The rapid development of the public-private partnership (PPP) model is closely related to the central government’s efforts to address the issues of local government debt. Local governments have long invested in infrastructure and public services projects by taking on debt through financing vehicles. Such moves have fuelled economic and social development, but have also led to a host of problems such as a lack of control over the size of local debt, elevated financing costs, and the failure to include revenues and expenditures under budgetary management.
In 2014, the State Council issued the Opinions on Strengthening the Management of Local Government Debts, calling for rigorous management of local debt and expressly stating that governments should not take on debt via private or state enterprises. It is against such a background that PPPs have grown rapidly as a new public service supply model, which can guard against and address government debt risk.
Under the PPP model, the government selects private investors that are capable of investing, operating and managing infrastructure projects on merit by letting them compete against each other. The government and the selected private investors then sign contracts to specify their rights, obligations and interests based on the principle of equal negotiations. Private investors provide public services and the government pays corresponding consideration to them based on the results of public services performance appraisals.
The PPP model has the following characteristics:
First, infrastructure and public services projects usually require huge investment. Of the second batch of pilot PPP projects published by the Ministry of Finance (MOF), 31.1% require investment of between RMB1 billion (US$153 million) to RMB5 billion, 7.8% need investment of RMB5-10 billion, and 7.2% have an investment of more than RMB10 billion.
Second, long operational periods. The Notice on Further Improving the Exemplary Work for Public-Private Partnership Projects, issued by the MOF, states that the period of co-operation between the government and private investors should, in principle, be no less than 10 years. In the MOF’s Operating Guidelines for the Public-Private Partnership Model, it is even required that the contract period of projects under the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT), Transfer-Operate-Transfer (TOT) and Rehabilitate-Operate-Transfer (ROT) models should generally last from 20-30 years.
Therefore, traditional financing methods such as loans are insufficient to satisfy the capital demand of PPP projects, making it necessary to combine the use of a number of funding methods. After private investors are determined, there will be two stages based on the operation process of PPP projects, namely project design and construction, and project operation.
At the stage of project design and construction, since the underlying assets have yet to form, projects can only be financed by project companies via loans or equity financing. In practice, since PPP project companies are usually financially weak, they need private investors (shareholders of PPP project companies) to guarantee their financing, putting huge financial pressure on private investors.
After PPP projects enter the operating stage, there are mainly three types of mechanisms to generate investment returns, namely fee payment by users, viability gap funding (VGF) and fee payment by the government, all of which can generate cash flows. At this point, funds can be raised via asset securitization so as to allow private investors to exit or alleviate their financial pressures. So it seems necessary to combine PPPs with asset securitization and convert cash flows of PPP projects into securitized products that can be invested while promoting the PPP model.
In terms of the transaction structure, there are two basic ways of securitization for PPP projects:
Asset securitization of future income. The Administrative Provisions on the Asset Securitization Business of Securities Companies and Subsidiaries of Fund Management Companies, issued by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) in November 2014, state that underlying assets include “real properties or the right to income from real properties such as infrastructure and commercial properties”. Therefore, asset-backed securities products can be designed based on the future income of PPP projects.
However, since future income is uncertain, attention needs to be paid to the following points during transaction structure design:
(1) reasonably select the originator (asset transferor). The amount of future income depends on whether the originator’s business can be conducted normally, so it is important that the originator has the ability to continue operations and be free of any major operating, financial or legal risks;
(2) develop measures to collect and monitor cash flows. To ensure timely collection of future income, a cashflow collection mechanism should be designed, and such cashflow should be monitored via account supervision;
(3) design credit enhancement structures. To guard against volatility risk of future cashflow, companies can design credit enhancement structures by making good shortfalls or providing excess coverage to make products more attractive.
Notably, the Guidelines for the Underlying Asset Negative List for the Asset Securitization Business, issued by the Asset Management Association of China in December 2014, states that “underlying assets with local governments as the direct or indirect debtors” should not be used as the underlying assets of asset-backed securities. However, the same Guidelines also specify that “fiscal subsidies to be paid or borne by local governments under the public-private partnership model in accordance with publicly disclosed pre-agreed provisions on incomes” are excluded. Therefore, fiscal subsidies in PPP projects can also be used as the underlying assets of asset-backed securities.
Dual-SPV structure featuring “trust scheme + asset-backed specific plan”. Under a dual-SPV structure, the trust company issues a trust loan to the PPP project company, which uses the future income of the PPP project as a pledge for the loan, thereby including the future income of the PPP project in the trust scheme. Then, an asset-backed specific plan is launched, with the right to benefit from the trust as the underlying asset.
It should be noted, however, that pursuant to the Guidelines for the Underlying Asset Negative List for the Asset Securitization Business, under a dual-SPV structure, the ultimate investment target of a trust scheme cannot be an asset type included in the negative list. Hence, when designing an asset-backed securities product with a dual-SPV structure, it should be examined whether the underlying asset of a trust scheme complies with relevant regulations.
作者：天元律师事务所北京办公室合伙人黄再再。他的联系电话是 +86 10 5776 3979；电邮是 [email protected]
Huang Zaizai is a partner in the Beijing office of Tian Yuan Law Firm. He can be contacted on +86 10 5776 3979 or by email at [email protected]
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