他山之石:PPP背景下,英国公路项目的投资与支付方式


来自:中国PPP知行汇     发表于:2016-07-08 14:18:06     浏览:644次

作者:FelixVillalba-RomeroChampika Liyanage

翻译:梁雪梅

The UK is a significant market for the delivery of largecapital investment projects through the use of PPPs. Due to currentmacro-economic issues in the UK; the government adopted a policy which utilisesthe PPP model in the creation of large scale infrastructure projects. This isan aid to driving economic growth and connecting industry efficiently, in orderto wider global economic markets, particularly directed to the expansion of theroad networks. Within a reduced spending policy of thegovernment, the involvement of the private sector and alternative financialinstitutions is now regarded as the only real alternative. Thebenefits of creating PPPs (Spackman, 2002) has been acknowledged as lower costsin projects than if carried out wholly by the private sector;and a higher rate of qualitythan if the project was wholly operated by the public sector (Mozoro andGasiorowski, 2008; Rangel and Galende, 2010).Historically, the investmentvehicles employed in a significant number of road infrastructure projects havebeen wholly financed without recourse to public funds. ThePublic partner pays for the service provided by the private sector partner,thus, creating a market which the private sector may find attractive forlong-term investment.The return of the investment on such projects in termsof revenue streams and payment structures have altered due to political andsocial pressures during the last 20 years.

对于需要投入大量资金的PPP项目来说,英国无疑是一个巨大的市场。基于当前宏观经济这一背景,英国政府采取了一系列利于PPP基础设施项目的政策,这将有助于推动经济的增长、提高工程的效率,尤其是会加速公路网络的扩张。而由于政府不断削减开支,私营部门和其他金融机构参与PPP项目已被认为是唯一的选择。相较于完全由社会资本方参与,政府与社会资本合作模式的优点就是项目成本较低,并且工程质量又较高。从之前的经验来看,公路基础设施项目的筹资已完全不再依靠公共资金。它是由社会资本方提供服务,政府方来付费,因此,市场的兴起可能会吸引社会资本方长期投资。在过去的20年里,由于政治和社会压力,这些项目在收入来源和支付结构方面的投资回报已经发生了变化。

The evolution of design, build, finance and operate(DBFO) contracts for road infrastructure is reflected with the changing methodsof payment employed. Apayment criterion encourages the private sector to participate, however, thereare a number of issues which are critical to private sector participation andvalue to the public sector. A number of payment strategies are employed on PPProad projects including direct tolling, shadow tolling and also performancerelated payment systems. Shadow tolling refers to usage payment based on numberand type of vehicles using the road, made by the Government (usually HighwaysAgency for roads), whilst performance payment is based on theresults achieved in some performance measures (e.g. safety, reliability) inaccordance with targeted objectives. The adoption of direct tolling as paymentmethod associated with PPP roads may have a negative impact since users arereluctant to accept direct charges. In effect, taxation has been historicallyused for funding roads in the UK; and the general public’s understanding isthat the government has to provide and maintain free road network for thepublic interest. This tradition may adversely affect thepotential income that a project may generate and is needed as future revenue streamsin order to finance road projects. For this reason, there is often arisk of optimistic bias in demand estimates on the part of the public sponsor. Asa result, the cost to finance the project may become prohibitive.Notwithstanding these risks, one of the main benefits of using direct tollingis the avoidance of burden upon the public budgets, therefore, ensuring noimpact in government deficit, a result that is very appealing within thepolitical system.

公路基础设施合同中,关于设计、建设、融资和运营(DBFO)方式的演变反映了付费方式的变化。虽然支付准则鼓励社会资本方的参与,但某些政策却对社会资本方较为苛刻,而对政府部门更有利。PPP公路项目的支付手段有直接收费、影子收费、或是其他与绩效相关的付费方式。影子收费是由政府(通常是公路交通局)基于车辆的数量和类型来支付费用的一种付费方式,而与绩效相关的付费方式是基于预定指标的完成程度(如安全性、可靠性)来付费的。直接收费方式可能会带来负面影响,因为使用者通常不愿意接受直接费用。历年来,英国的税收都被用于资助公路项目的建设。公众认为:为了公共利益,政府应免费提供和维护公路网络。这一传统理念可能会影响公路项目的潜在收入,进而影响项目融资所需的未来现金流。基于上述原因,政府方在预测直接付费公路项目的使用量时,往往产生乐观偏差风险(即高估公路使用量),导致项目融资成本节节上升。尽管有这些风险,但直接收费不会对公共预算造成负担,不会造成政府赤字,因此直接收费对政府方非常有吸引力。

Alternative payment models employed bypass these concernsof the public, as the payment is made by the government rather than by theuser, such as shadow tolling, and performance related techniques. However,shadow tolling reverses the effect of optimistic bias on the government and,therefore, there is a risk that payments may increase beyond anticipated levels,unless payments are capped to a maximum level. The private sector ismore content to operate within contracts that use shadow tolling because oflower traffic volatility and,therefore, higher revenue predictability.

影子收费是由政府方支付公路使用费用,它与其他基于绩效的付费方式可以有效规避上述问题。然而,在影子收费方式下,政府方往往出现反向的预测偏差(即低估公路的使用量),因此在没有设定最高付费阈值的情况下,政府方的支付金额经常超出预测水平。社会资本方更倾向于在合同中规定使用影子收费方式,因为交通流量的波动性较低,社会资本方预期会产生高收益。

Hybrid shadow tolling methods attempt to overcome thisrisk, incorporating performance criteria into the contract. This, in effect,incentivises the private sector to ensure the road is available and safe touse.There are penalties where there are failures in these key performancemeasures. Performance related payments benefit both the public and privatesectors, by incorporating it into the payment structure.This method of paymentstructure is a preferred option for many in the private sector and thoseinvolved in the financing of these projects. The risk profiles ofprojects using performance measures as payment are lower than those forprojects just as direct or shadow tolling translating into competitivestable interest costs. This though can also lead to apotential benefit to the private sector provider in the event of refinancing.

演变的影子收费方式将绩效指标纳入到合同中,试图来减少上述风险。事实上,付费时考量绩效情况,会促使社会资本方确保公路能够安全又有效的使用。如果没有达到这些关键绩效指标的话,对社会资本方是会有惩罚的。付费时考量绩效情况,这对政府方和社会资本方都是有益的。因此,这种支付结构是社会资本方参与这些PPP项目融资的首选方案。付费时考量绩效指标,这一付费方式的风险比直接收费和影子收费方式的风险更低,这可能会有益于社会资本方再融资。

Refinancing often takes place after project completion,when there is a different risk profile, once design and construction risks areeliminated. This process usually generate a refinancing gain that may becalculated to compare the resulting net present value (NPV) after refinancingwith the original NPV at the initial financial close, which typically isreached after contract is granted in order to finance the required works.Refinancing gain should be shared with the public sector either through alump-sum payment, or by reducing the unitary charge for the users (HM Treasury–Infrastructure, 2002). The market may offer substantially improved ratesduring the restructuring of debt as the risks are reduced, which, in turn,enhances the profitability of the project for the private sector. This can leadto suggestions that the project does not represent VfM to the public finances,as the original agreed costs might have been inflated to incorporate overassumed risk factors (HM Treasury – Infrastructure, 2005).The assessmentwhether PPP projects are implemented well and generate VfM is assessed by theNational Audit Office (NAO) (2006) that follows a defined framework at anyphase of a PPP project’s lifecycle. HM Treasury holds responsibility forsetting PPP Policy for England, and this is devolved in Scotland, Wales andNorthern Ireland, following similar frameworks. For example, Transport Scotland(the Scottish national transport agency) who manages the provision andprocurement of roads in Scotland, seeks to deliver a safe, efficient,cost-effective and sustainable transport system for the benefit of the people.The value assessment of their projects is carried out following ScottishExecutive VfM Assessment Guidance in conjunction with the HM Treasury VfMGuidance (Scottish Futures Trust (SFT), 2011). Other importantprocurement feature, introduced by the Scottish Government, was the competitivedialogue (CD) procedure under the Public Contracts (Scotland) Regulation in2006. CD is a procedure usually conducted in successive stages, whereby anInstitution is able to conduct dialogue with bidders directly with the aim ofdeveloping one or more suitable alternative solutions to meet its requirements.Hoezen et al. (2010, 2012) has extensively studied the CD contracting dynamics,forms, framework and processes applied in the Dutch highways, particularly fromthe Coen Tunnel project.

工程竣工后,往往需要进行再融资。这时候的设计和建设风险已经消除,却产生了其他的风险。再融资过程中,通常能够计算出产生的再融资收益,然后与再融资后的净现值(NPV)和初始财务结算时的净现值进行比较,这一过程通常发生在合同授予之后,这时融资所需的一切都已准备就绪。再融资的收益应与政府部门共享,而收益共享可以通过一次性付款的方式,也可以通过降低用户整体费用的方式(英国财政部–基础设施,2002)。由于债务重组的过程中减少了风险,市场会提供更为优惠的利率,这就提高了社会资本方的盈利能力。由此将导致此项目不能实现公共财政的物有所值(VfM),因为当初约定的费用有可能被抬高了,这一费用可能将假定的风险因素也考虑进去了(财政部–基础设施,2005)。PPP项目是否顺利落地,是否实现物有所值(VfM),这由国家审计署(NAO)来进行评估。国家审计署的评估会遵循一个明确的框架规定,这个框架包含了PPP项目全生命周期的所有阶段。英国财政部遵循类似的框架来制定PPP政策,这些政策不仅适用于英国大陆,同时适用于苏格兰、威尔士和北爱尔兰等地区。例如,苏格兰交通部(苏格兰国家运输局)负责苏格兰公路的供给和采购,为了人民的利益,苏格兰交通部力求提供一个安全,高效,符合成本效益的和可持续发展的交通系统。项目的物有所值由两个部门共同来进行评估,这两个部门分别是苏格兰物有所值评估指导中心和英国财政部物有所值指导中心(苏格兰期货信托(SFT),2011)。另一个比较受青睐的采购方式是竞争性对话,在2006年,苏格兰政府制定的公共合同(苏格兰)条例规范了这一方式。竞争性对话通常在连续阶段进行,采购当局与其选定的投标人进行磋商,这一对话的目的在于提供一个或多个合适的解决方案,以满足采购当局的要求。2010年和2012hoezen等人已经广泛地研究了竞争性对话的形式、框架以及流程,主要针对的是荷兰的公路建设,特别是科恩隧道这一工程。

The financial crisis produced a credit crunch whichstrongly affected to privately financed infrastructure projects and roadprojects in particular, shortening the overall financing availability andincreasing the cost of financing.This had a special impact on the fundingarrangements worldwide considering the dependency of PPP funding from capitalmarkets (Regan et al., 2011). According to NAO (2010a), in the UK, interestrate margin increased from 0.79 per cent (2007 pre-crisis) up to 4.50 per cent(April 2009) and final interest cost from 5.9 per cent to up to 8.91 per cent.As a result, financing large projects such as construction of the Olympicsstadium in London was a big challenge. Within this, alternative financingoptions were considered and government plans to ensure lending included thecreation of the Infrastructure Finance Unit, with thepurpose of funding shortfalls in bank finance on privately financedinfrastructure projects.

金融危机导致了信贷紧缩,这严重影响了社会资本方对基础设施项目和公路项目的投资热情,导致融资变得困难,从而增加了融资成本。考虑到PPP项目资金依赖于资本市场,因此金融危机对世界范围内的融资都产生了重大影响(里根等人,2011)。根据2010年英国国家审计署公布的数据,在2007年金融危机前,英国的利率水平是0.79%,到2009年危机后,利率已经增加到了4.50%,而且最终的利息成本从5.9%增加到了8.91%。因此,例如在伦敦建设奥运场馆这样的大型项目的融资是一个很大的挑战。由于上述情况,政府已经考虑使用其他的融资途径,政府为了确保有充足的资金,计划创建基础设施融资部,目的是在银行资金短缺的情况下,从社会资本方融得资金建设基础设施项目。

It is hoped that the above changes will last long toimprove the operation of PPP/PFI schemes within the UK (HM Treasury, 2012).Alan Cook (Chair of the Highways Agency)highlights the need to be more strategic in the approach to financing anddelivering road infrastructure in the UK over a long period of time withimproved relationships with providers (Cook, 2011). The answer to the above wasintroduction of strategies by the government to look at “radical” alternativesto the financing of roads in the future (Transport, 2012).

我们希望上述变化可以持续很长一段时间,这样就可以对政府与社会资本合作模式和民间主动融资(PPP/PFI)的运行起到促进作用(英国财政部,2012)。艾伦.库克(公路局的部长)强调,在很长一段时间内,英国在公路基础设施的融资过程和移交过程都需要运用更多的策略,以此来改善与供给方的关系(库克,2011)。以上问题的解决办法就是,在未来的公路项目融资过程中,政府采用更加“激进”的融资策略(交通运输部,2012)。

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